Conservation and overcoming of natural attitude. Merleau-Ponty’s critique to reduction thought

Abstract

In a first moment, the Merleâu-Ponty s philosophy finds in phenomenology its anchorage. His purpose is <<understand the relaitions between the conscience and the nature» (S. C., p. 1 ), knowing that these relations are crossed by a crisis that questions the basís of experience. Crisis announced already by Husserl and whose solution passed by the application of the descriptive method to all sciences However, the descriptive method, like the Freiburg’s master defines it, doesn’t escape to the transcendental idealism, for the redson that the sensible contours of the world disappears in its thematisation by the conscience. In this sense, the Merledu-Ponty s thinking goes farthest, to revalue the limits of the phenomenological reduction and to accuse the privilege of the transcendental ego’s decision in the construction of a transparent world, façade without profoundness of the real sensible appedrins.