LINGUAGEM NATURAL E MENTE
Abstract
The objective of this paper is to defend Searle's concept of language. First, the two predominant trends in the philosophy
of language - here called internalism (Chomsky and Fodor) and externalism (Ryle and Wittgenstein) - are put face to face.
These maior trends are then argued to be unsatisfactory as explanations of meaning. Searle's view is presented as a third alternative; language is a,species of the genus intentional action, this genus being characterized in terms of conditions
of satisfaction represented in the mental content of the action. The agent has, following Pred, non-observational awareness
of this content. The species language is analysed as imposition of meaning, i.e., imposition of (semantic) conditions of
satisfaction on other (physical) conditions of satisfaction of the action.
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References
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Copyright (c) 2024 Renato SCHAEFFER
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