LEIS, CONFIRMAÇÃO E LÓGICA INDUTIVA
Abstract
According to Carnap's first criterion of meaningfulness a synthetic statement is genuine or meaningful if it is verifiable. This criterion eliminates all universal statements as metaphysical meaningless pseudo-statements. This is the case of scientific laws and theories. To save the laws, Carnap changes his criterion. The second criterion does not require but the confirmability of a statement to be considered meaningful. Carnap’s inductive logic would give mathematical treatment to the concept of degree of confinmation. But the degree of confirmation of a universal statement it is not different from zero, so the problem of the scientific laws remains unsolved.
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