IDENTIDADE PESSOAL E EU MORAL EM DAVID HUME
Abstract
The topic of personal Identity, as it is developed in A Treatise of Human Nature, (T), presents us with some troubling viewpoints
because of their inconsistency. To begin with, Hume asserts that "the identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man, is only a fictitious one" (T 259). Secondty, he states that -the impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us- (T 317). Can an author who focuses a noteworthly section of his philosophy on the field of ethics cast doubt on the self, or even preclude it as the subject of morality? Making a distinction in the concept of identity by taking a closer look at the term substance and the functional dynamism of perceptions would seem to provide us with a solution. Does calling personal identity into question imply a relativizing
of the moral self ? Hume’s work takes for granted a theory of the moral self 's identity, even though he does not offer a clearcut explanation of it. Hume’s treatment of the moral self is, by its very nature. hedonistic and altruistic. Whereas his thoughts on personal identity seem ambivalent, they become more settled when, in making use of psychological and naturalistic parameters. he describes a person as a syfàpathetic, passional and benevolent moral human being.
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