Phenomenology Naturalization and methodological perspectives on Psychology experimental research
Keywords:
Cognition, Phenomenology, Methodology, Experimental psychologyAbstract
The aim of the paper is to discuss the relationship between Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences based on what the international literature denominates as Naturalization of Phenomenology. We discuss the research trends in the field. First, we differentiate the introspective approach methods from the Cognitive Science and Experimental Phenomenology methods. A trend in the naturalization of phenomenology is front-loaded phenomenology, which is characterized as a kind of experimental phenomenology that uses philosophical phenomenology as a tool to inform and refine experimental design settings in research focused on the basic psychological processes. The prerogative of front-loaded model is to promote experiential variation in humans by means of perceptual illusions and cognitive performance, under controlled experimental conditions. Finally, we discuss the limits between Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences, pointing to the necessary distinction between Phenomenology as a foundational science and Phenomenology as a pre-experimental science open to interdisciplinary dialogue.
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