Fantasy and fiction in religion: monster-bodies as abject in the book of Job: a psychoanalytic perspective

Abstract

The question about fantasy and fiction in religion is probably as old as the first interrogation and critique of revealed religion. However, the relation between fiction and religion is a two-way street. Underlying both is imagination which brings into play the psychological dimension of both but this in turn is always based on the body. Fantasy dreamily imagines the perfect body precisely to try and fill the gap left by imperfection. As an example from religious fiction, the two monstrosities in the second divine speech virtually at the end of the book of Job will be viewed through the hermeneutical lens of abjection, as explained by Julia Kristeva. As projections of the sick protagonist’s own frustrated sexual and aggressive impulses embodied as abject animal bodies they are surprisingly celebrated by the Divine who can contain the id in its protest against the superego. In the tension between play and seriousness in this transitional space negotiated by the ego creativity rooted in the chaotic and free, polymorph perversity opens the door to the revelation from the unconscious. The fundamental question remains, however, if this creativity is purely human meaning-making or tapping into the divine through some kind of intuition.

Keywords: Abject. Book of Job. Fantasy. Fiction. Monster.
Introduction

The context of this study is the growing number of new, “invented religions” which refuse traditional legitimation (Cusack, 2010) but which show how religions are “man-made”. An important feature of such religions is the roles which fantasy, play, creativity and fiction have, underlying to which is a unitive, somatic condition, manifested in the embodied way in which children act out their inner experiences (Cusack, 2013). This confirms the pertinence of the body for critical identity and the sacred in post-structuralist philosophy. Whereas the work by Cusack explored the fictional and narrative nature of these religions, there is still a lack of focus on the role of the body in these fantasies. It is this lacuna which this study wishes to fill.

Built on the virtually axiomatic assumption that all human activity ultimately refers to the body, religion therefore also stems from the body (Kovach, 2002), but is also mirrored by the body (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 2003), even when an alleged revelation from outside meets this fundamentally centripetal gravitation.

The hypothesis of this study is that the narratives produced by these “invented religions” – and possibly all religions – are based on body-images as fantasies built on abjection but projected as specular images (Lacan, 1966a) which are like “fantômes qui le dominent” (phantoms which dominate him [that is, a person]) (Lacan, 1966b, p. 95). This will be supported, firstly, by focusing on fantasy from a psychoanalytic perspective, followed by converging on images of animals and monsters in these fantasies, using the second divine speech in the book of Job as example (Van der Zwan, 2021), but also relating them to current cultural fandoms involving at least partially animal fantasies. These monstrous bodies will be regarded as the protagonist's imaginary projection of his abject and more specifically perverse and disabled body, their meaning ironically found in the ego's assertive challenge to the exclusion of the abusive superego's ideal body.

When religion is regarded as symbolised idealism, the compensation offered by the corrective imagination is that of creating and imaging “other worlds” (Bloch, 2008, p. 2055) and more specifically “other bodies”.

A psychoanalytic focus on fantasy

For Freud (1941) a fantasy was the hallucinatory and therefore magical but disguised expression of a repressed wish, primarily due to the body not being satisfied, and as such based on introjection and projection. Freud furthermore emphasised the simultaneous multiplicity of wishes and visions in fantasy so that the frustrated subject has distance from the desired object which is not that of instinctual self-preservation from hunger but its substitute sexual-object. Through such phantasmatisation of the maternal breast as pleasure-object an increasingly psychic image is created as mediation away from the original bodily need. These fantasies continue as daydreams which are a split-off pleasure-principle by-product of developing adaptation to the reality principle, as desires are infinite and cannot be limited by the superego defining external reality. They remain highly cathected and constitute the essence of personality. Creativity is the constructive channelling of their energy lest they become (neurotic) symptoms.

For Klein, unconscious phantasies² of relations of internalised part-objects are more aggressive and violent than conscious fantasies. They are, however, innate and not primarily the compensatory by-products

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² Consciente “fantasies” have been distinguished from unconscious “phantasies”.

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of frustrated satisfaction. As psychic representations of bodily drives they are often based on anxiety but also on aggression. They are conflations of multiple images as internalised external objects. Initially, the infant is in the paranoid-schizoid position when in phantasy persecuting figures such as monsters are raging, life-destroying and threatening even the infant itself (Klein, 1946). When the infant in the depressive position, however, discovers and realises that the good and the bad are both parts of the same object it becomes remorseful and tries through loving fantasies to repair and heal what these monsters have destroyed in phantasy (Klein, 1975). This releases the infant, but also later the adult, from the energy stuck in inner psychic conflicts.

Rojcewicz (1990, p. 270) makes the point that “the therapeutic use of imagery” is not limited to a daydream’s wish fulfillment but also expresses emotional and ego dynamics. He refers to a technique “le rêve éveillé dirigé” (directed daydream) developed by Desoille (1938), where images of monsters representing a superego arising in consciousness are re-contextualised to domesticate them. This reminds one of what God does when portraying the two monstrous images in the book of Job.

The psychology of Religion has given little attention to fantasy and fiction. Fantasy proneness has been found, however, to be related to boundary deficits (Hood et al., 2018; Hood, 2005). Boyatzis (2005) does point out that fantasy in religion is not limited to irrational and egocentric infancy and that parents in different religions react differently to their children’s fantasy in religion. Geels (2006) regards the integration of the ego and the id as relevant for both intense religious experiences such as visions and creativity.

The recent development of “invented religions” may either have led to or is itself a manifestation of the postmodern intersubjectivity's renewed fascination with fantasy as interpersonal communication advocating transcendence beyond the Freudian pleasure and reality principles to an “emotional fantasy principle” (Adams, 1996 p. 8). At the same time postmodern fascination with transgression, such as the increasing inclusion of perversion in monogamous heterosexuality (McAvan, 2007), also reflects its desire for a real, authentic body. Together these two tendencies ironically imply that fantasy is not unreal but assumed to be the real beyond the false façade of civilisation which produces body-hatred through its hyperreality.

Although Cusack (2016) claims that only the minutest minority of narratives, mainly fantasy and science-fiction, develop into religions, one can assume that all religions stem to a certain extent from fantasy, and the question, therefore, is which fantasies succeed to become religions. Imagination allows the playful recognition of potential realities beyond the status quo, creating new and other worlds through special language and special characters Cusack (2016) such as gods, demons, monsters, angels, ancestors, dragons, vampires, aliens, unicorns and animated inanimate things (Cusack; Kosnác, 2017) in literature well known for its exploration of the ambiguity of the abject. This literature can, of course, later become religious scripture. The more law and professional ambition are embedded in religion, the less is the chance of “[…] any freedom of opinion, any deeper feeling, any humane impulse of compassion, phantasy, and creativity” (Beier, 2004, p. 233). The early Christian religion has defended itself against the apparent similarity with its neighbouring religions as them being based on fantasy while Christianity was supposed to be based on historical reality (Beier, 2004). Ironically, historical criticism has exposed many “fantasies” in the structure of Christianity because historicity has been limited by a positivist stance. Both these tendencies in Christianity, though with perspectives from opposite directions, denigrate fantasy as unreal.

Similar to Kristeva’s location of the abject in the maternal semiotic, Wilber’s (1996) transpersonal psychology regards the phantasmic-emotional, that is the identification of the ego with the body, as still
in the pre-personal, pre-egoic stage. Regression to animal images due to trauma is at the same time a reminder that humanity is deeply rooted in the animalistic, the id.

From this brief survey of the forms of fantasy, it is clear that they can differ widely from persecutory to narcissistic megalomaniac to depressive efforts at repair. Common to all, however, images of disturbing bodies which will now be looked at from three vantage points, after a brief detour through animal body-fantasies.

**Animalistic body-fantasies**

Supernatural beings, especially ancient deities, often have a hybrid of animal and human bodies often with “[…] counterintuitive physical properties… [and] biology” (Boyer, 2001, p. 15). This could have originated in totemism and shamanism involving an animal imagined as the ultimate ancestor (MacLennan, 1869, 1870). In the Otherkin and its relative (though not a subset), therianthropy in this twenty-first century, there is likewise a centrifugal search for identity and spirituality outside of (conscious) humanity. This is claimed to be found in the former by being partially beyond the human in the supernatural, in the latter case being related to animals (Robertson, 2013). As play with alterity and hybridity in a fluid and “unfinalizable” identity (Cusack, 2017), they critically interrogate binary categories such as human-animal. They are rather privatised instead of public and institutional forms of religion, although numerous communities are, however, existing online. Even when these hypermodern, post-humanist and eco-spiritual groups are stimulated by the virtual worlds and realities of cyberspace in the current media age, they are meaningful for research about ancient monstrosities because they are ultimately anchored in these ancient beliefs. Imagination about the mysterious origins of time is mostly characterised by strange animals.

Their alleged ancestry is also located in literary monsters from medieval and early modern times. Therianthropy claiming a change from a human into an animal form or vice versa through shapeshifting is related to but different from theriocephaly where a human body has an animal head such as Ra in the ancient Egyptian religion or the Chinese P’an Hu or supernatural dog, the descendants of which are monsters of mixed bodies. According to Cusack (2017), therians believe they are animal spirits in human bodies with which they identify or desire to be. Opposite to therians, the furry fandom comprises people who imagine or have (fuzzy) plush toys, many of which are animals, with whom they identify as having anthropomorphic features and “fursonas”, as a play on “persona” (Bernstein *et al.*, 2008).

Derived from the Latin, “*monstrum*”, monsters are warning signs, even omens, de-*monstr*-ating the demons at the open peripheries as non-boundaries and re-*monstr*-ating against the centre as identity, matters of capital importance. Cohen (1996) therefore interprets culture through its monsters and identified seven theses in this respect: 1) Their bodies is a cultural body, projected, constructed and incorporating all sorts of emotions and fantasies. 2) They always escape. 3) They refuse categorisation which they bring into a crisis. 4) They embody difference. 5) They resist and exist at the edge of the possible. 6) Fearing them is actually desiring them. 7) They exist at the threshold of being.

The monstrous is ambiguously in-between, and evokes both dread and fascination, anxiety and desire, reminding one of Otto’s (1917) idea of the holy as *mysterium tremendum et fascinans*, experienced as “das Unheimliche” (the uncanny) and well expressed by “Ungeheuer” (monsters; added as the eighth chapter to his 14th edition of 1926), especially referring to the two in the book of Job (Otto, 1917) as a hint of “*das ganz Andere*” (the wholly Other), but still only as gross expression of the mysterious (compared to the *šālīy* [subtle, shrewd, sensible] serpent in Genesis 3:1), as if it were enlarged under a

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magnifying glass in order to emphasise something. In fact, Shildrick (2002) regards the monster as the
Freudian uncanny, referring back to the familiar, a kind of double that haunts and which one would
rather repress in normalising oblivion.

Related to these fantasies are claims of reincarnation in different life forms (sometimes as
“punishment”), sexual relations between humans and animals, and the myth of the sons of God marrying
human daughters in Genesis 6:2, also mentioned at the beginning of the book of Job 1:6 and 2:1.

Almost at the end of the book Job has visions of Behemoth and Leviathan. The metaphorical usage
of both these figures has developed from these literal and literary chaos-monsters, ironically created by
God. Even when this study is not meant to be an exegetical exercise, the biblical text in which these
original images of the two animals are ultimately anchored, needs to be briefly scanned.

Behemoth and leviathan in the book of Job

The section about Behemoth in the book of Job are 10 verses, 40:15-24, and that about Leviathan,
the longest about an animal in the Hebrew Bible, starts straight thereafter, 40:25-41:26, that is a total
of 34 verses, a mammoth presence overshadowing the former. They both appear virtually at the end of
God’s silence or perhaps that of Job’s unconscious, a high-point, peak- and limit experience. It is only after
these images, perhaps hinted at in 7:14 already, that the denouement can follow in the last chapter with
God’s cleaning-up act and unexpected surprise announcements. Even when there is in 40:15 a similarity
and companionship between Behemoth and Job, and 41:25 Leviathan is somehow similar to Job in 1:8
and 2:3 in being unique, their bodies serve as correctives to Job’s abject, fluid and broken body: they both
live in “fluid” environments but their bold bodies blaze their own trail independent from expectations.

Beal (2002) notices that the same verb, חגנ (burst forth), used in 38:8 for some oceanic birth, is used
again in 40:23 for the gush of water breaking forth towards or into Behemoth’s mouth. The verb, קשע
(oppress, overflow), also in the last-mentioned verse indicates that it concerns excess as if an explosion.
As image Behemoth is then like the recipient of the neonatal being washed out of the womb in
3:10-12 (cf. also 3:24). In the Hebrew Bible the book of Job, apart from Leviticus, probably mentions
the most body-fluids leaking through orifices, suggesting the meaning leaking from the psyche
with which Job is struggling.

No general word for “monster” is used in the Hebrew Bible, the monsters are all specified and
the first is already mentioned in Genesis 1:21: ים (the sea-monsters). The book of Job is exceptional
in mentioning monsters (known to be such thanks to intertextuality with the rest of the Hebrew Bible)
so many times, with the same ים (sea-monster) and ים (a sea, or Yam, without an article as the proper
name of the personified Sea, echoed by God in 38:8) with which Job identifies in 7:12 and ים (Rahab,
storm, arrogance) in 9:13 and 26:12. Already in 3:8 Job somehow conjures up Leviathan linking it to
curses and chaos. This is in the same chapter where Job calls for the undoing of creation and expresses
his struggles with the problematic womb (Van der Zwan, 2019) of his (monstrous or masochistic?) mother
whom he significantly never explicitly mentions, elsewhere only thrice: 1:21, 17:14 and 31:18, in two
of which connected to her womb and twice connected to death. This reminds one of Kristeva’s (1980)
notion of the abject embodied in the rejected “corps maternel” (maternal body, from which one is so
violently separated, even when it cannot be remembered. The abject is at the same time the repressed
lost object offered in sacrifice as base of all religion (Freud, 1944; Kristeva, 1980). God echoes much
which Job says in this third chapter, for instance, the same words in 3:9, עין-עין (eye-lids of the morning),
are repeated in 41:10 where they resemble the fire-spitting Leviathan’s eyes.
From the intimidating postures of these monstrosities, one would assume them to be expressions of the superego. However, their bestiality rather reminds one of the gross features of the id, culturally constrained by the collective superego. Against the prevailing dominance of the superego in the book of Job, the anima-animal shadow-figures of alterity and yet similarity ultimately gain the spotlight at the end of the book.

Behemoth (נַעֲרָסָה being the augmented plural of the Hebrew, נאָרֹס [beast], hence the “supreme beast”) Clines (2011) is mostly translated as a proper name to suggest its uniqueness, as a definite article is lacking. This is also reinforced by several hapax legomena and suggested by its primacy (chronologically or as a “masterpiece”) in 40:19, where, however, it is said to have been made (not “created”) “with” Job (푓푤 [with you]), so somehow on par with him, or even part of him. The same applies to Leviathan, which is probably related to Litan, the monster-god, in the Ugaritic Baal-Anat cycle, although in the Hebrew Bible⁴ Leviathan is viewed in contradictory and conflicting ways (Beal, 2002), just as the abject. However, in the second divine speech God can contain this contradiction. Beal also emphasises the ambivalence about the monsters being inside or outside of creation, once again as with the abject. As third similarity with the abject, both monstrous animals are portrayed as rather horrible, probably imperfect, but powerful bodies.

Whereas Van der Zwan (2021) has argued that the animal bodies portrayed in the book of Job would have been internalised by the main protagonist, the inverse is argued herein that the two monstrous animals are also the protagonist’s fantasies – even of revelations by God when they stem from the unconscious – which have been projected into verbal images but are ultimately based in his own body experiences and body-images, just as Hobbes (1994)⁴ many centuries later understood the leviathan as the collective body politic, politicising collective aggression as Isaiah 27:1, for instance, has also done. Body-images, always precarious and dynamic, are a hybrid of subjective and intersubjective input (Gallagher; Zahavi, 2008), main components for meaning (Butnaru, 2020) and can extend, “transgress”, beyond the body boundaries (Merleau-Ponty, 1945; Gallagher, 2012) into the abysmal abject. As body-images are, ironically, always based on the exclusion of abject body-realities, including both deficiencies and excesses, they are always distorted (Weiss, 1999).

That the poetically depicted monsters can be taken figuratively is clear not only from the reception history (Newsom, 2009) but also intertextually in the Hebrew Bible, for instance, in Psalm 89:11 (cf. Psalm 87:4 and Isaiah 30:7) where the monster, Rahab (which some regard as Leviathan) according to Beal (2002), represents Egypt (as עִמָּם הֵמוֹת אתּ [the great dragon] in Ezekiel 29:3) as demonised and defeated, and yet deified in the background mythology.

As part-projections of the outcast, Job, interpreted by Girard (1985) as a scapegoat sacrificed by his community, the animalistic monsters express something of the abject of the protagonist. Kristeva (1988), incidentally, takes up precisely this notion of the scapegoat as a type of abjection, even when the abject is always inside. The scapegoat, therefore, carries the collective aggression, just as the two monsters seem to do.

Such aggression is suggested by the monsters’ body-parts in 40:16-18, 23 and 41:5-16 where they serve as subtle euphemisms for embodied, oral (41:10-13) and phallic (40:16-17) aggression. This is precisely the drive which Job wishes to unleash through invocation for the sake of self-destruction in 3:8 already, but which God can contain, even urging him twice to (gird up your

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⁴ Vide: Psalm 74:13-14 where sea-monsters and leviathan have multiple heads crushed by God, and so are regarded as enemies compared to Psalm 148:7 where they praise God.

⁵ Originally in 1651.
loins now like a man) in 38:3, repeated in 40:7. Some commentators (Clines, 2011) have understood even אֲרֵבָּה (sword) in 40:19 as belonging to Behemoth itself, referring to its tusks. This would then serve as adumbration of the hunting motif in 40:24-26 and 41:18-21, where ten different weapons are considered, including once again a אֲרֵבָּה (sword) in 41:18, to try to bring them under control.

External attacks on these abject bodies are, however, futile due to Behemoth’s invulnerable body in 40:19, 23 and Leviathan’s scornful attitude according to 41:20-21. The latter’s armoured, impenetrable cover in 41:5-9 and its angry facial fire in 41:10-13 are described almost in a military way, even when it remains static in its stable yet intimidating body in 41:14-17 (Clines, 2011).

The word, נַי (is not), in the summarising 41:25 is a clear indication of the fearless abject which is incomparable יָשֵּׁר (on earth), where it dominates like a king – but ironically from below – the false, fragile and pretentious pride according to 41:26. Clines (2011) points out, that nine of the total of eleven instances of יָשֵּׁר in the Hebrew Bible occur in the book of Job where it always suggests fragility and temporariness, how Bataille (1970) explains abjection. Having no יָשֵּׁר (likeness) suggests that no parallel and therefore no symbolisation is possible, as is the case with abjection.

The abject body

Abjection is the violent exclusion of a foreign body which threatens and causes anxiety at the body’s fragile boundaries which are socially projected due to desire but which, ironically, depend on this abjection. In the book of Job, 40:8-14 may be interpreted as the ironic self-speech of the “conscious”, social order, putting itself on a divine pedestal, to discard the judged in 40:13: סָפַן מִשְּפִּים יְהִי יָשֵּׁר אִישׁ חָכָם מִלְחָמָה (hide them in the dust together; bind their faces in the hidden place) thus saving itself from the wicked, to rephrase 40:14.

Identity depends on monstering alterity. The powerful horror at the idea of merging with the (heterogeneous) other causes both disgust and fascination, is both awful and awe-inspiring, repulsive and attractive: the other could invade (Creed, 1993) and dissolve the self in intimacy (Kristeva, 1980) and mysticism, thus blurring the distinction between inside and outside through integration. That is why Miller (1966) interprets all boundaries and borders with the metaphor of suture.

Although the feeling could be psychically induced, the threat of being contaminated by materiality other than the own body renders the intruding abject contagious and untouchable (Kristeva, 1980). The experience is therefore expressed somatically, such as by vomiting, and symbolically best by cursing and expletives. One does not know anymore where the boundaries of identity are as the abject reminds one of the abyss of nothingness from which one was born and into which one would finally fall. The anxiety which banishes the abject is the same anxiety which flees from the sacred (Arya, 2014). Staring into the abyss, Job finds the abyss staring into him, being overwhelmed by God, the Real of the material body, staring into him, through the liberating (return of the repressed) monsters within him (Beal, 2002). This is in contrast to the narcissist staring onto the surface of her or his own reflections, seeing her- or himself in everything else.

Kristeva (1980) identifies food and incorporation, bodily waste as expulsion and ultimately macabre corpses, and signs of sexual difference as the three main areas of abjection, from which the social body is constructed. Introjection of originally external objects throws the boundaries of the psyche into doubt. This is also with projection and evacuation in the case of self-purging through (automatically impure,
improper and defiled) bodily excretions, particularly female and even more specifically maternal excretions, as waste and refuse because these are reminiscent of death, materiality and animality.

Abjection is also felt when one is confronted with animalistic monsters as misfits and therefore some kind of bodily transgression (Coeckelbergh, 2020) of profane limits, opening up the continuity of the sacred at the margins and periphery. Although the abject is universal, it has different forms and “dumping-sites” such as prisons, ghettos or even nature depending on the social order of discipline and normalisation, that is, the superego.

Kristeva (1980) spends a chapter on abomination in the Bible. This could be regarded as a subtheme in the book of Job where it is expressed with a variety of vocabulary but virtually always with Job viewing himself as the object of abjection having been “cast out” (originally, from the womb in chapter 3). At the same time he experiences the cause of this ejection as uncanny (“das Unheimliche” for Jentsch (2014)* and Freud (1982)†), a contradictory response because it is linked to the gravitational, tabooed maternal body often re-embodied in the monster, hence the aesthetics of the abject cathartically experienced in fantasy.

In fact, for Kristeva the abject is in the first instance the (semiotic) maternal body from which one is separated and which needs to be repressed as archaic, primal life before and because of the (symbolic) paternal language. The abject is then prior to the discontinuity of subject-object, the self-(m)other, animal-human, nature-culture and the unconscious-conscious distinctions. For Butler (1990), however, the abject is instead the waste-product of the subject and the symbolic order; how “the dominant order excrementalizes its dispossessed”. This resonates with Lacan’s (1973) assertion that the subject is ultimately based in filth.

Prenatal life and death are the two temporal extremities of the aggressive abject to be avoided and withstood in order to survive. Kristeva (1980) regards the abject as both breakdown of discontinuous boundaries and as rupture of continuity exposing one to archaic space and to the borderline abyss in the ambiguous liminality, explored by art and literature. She idealises the bodily Real as intruding into the (always contingent and vulnerable) Symbolic order and subversively disrupting its exclusive monopoly. It is precisely with these two realms, birth and death, that Job is psychically struggling. Job looks back and forward to two periods of death which entrap life. Religion tries to purify one from the abject and finding the abject in a religious text as the book of Job is suspect of having cleansing and reparation intentions.

Kristeva, however, never refers to the book of Job but numerous times to the Torah and more specifically to Leviticus with its many purity laws. Although Basson (2008) recognises Job as an abject figure, he does not extrapolate this to the portrayal of the monster-bodies at the end of the book as Job’s projection of his abject body. Mary Douglas’ (1966) sense of the abject expressed in the concept of dirt aptly applies to the protagonist’s skin in 7:5: (My flesh is clothed with worms and clods of dust; my skin closes up and breaks out afresh). It is significant that the skin as body-boundary is the focus for both Job and the animal-bodies when it is rehabilitated by Behemoth in 40:31a: (Can you fill his skin with barbed irons?) and by Leviathan in 41:7-9: (His scales are his pride, shut up together as with a close seal. One is so near to another that no air can come between them. They are joined one to another; they stick together, that they cannot be sundered.) Here Job’s experientially fragmented body is mirrored as if it were whole and strong through fantasies of abject, mother-monster-bodies showcasing Job’s wild, animalistic aggression which keeps him together, as it is kept together and contained by God. This is the return of the repressed in its many forms.

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* Originally in 1906.  
† Originally in 1919.  

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**Perverse Body**

One such form is a perverted body, which does not morally fit the expected model or which behaves in transgressive ways. Storr (1964) found that perverts are mostly introverts with a rich fantasy life (Stoller, 1986). Kristeva (1980) regards the abject as pervert because it ignores, corrupts and rebels against the superego of the social order, on which it ironically depends. This is shown by the fascination with criminals and monsters in current popular culture (Kearney, 2005).

Chasseguet-Smirgel (1984) partially deviates from the classic interpretation of perversion by recognising its link with creativity. She notices something of the human condition in its constant attempt to avoid the limits of the real, by revolting again God the Father and reaching towards the impossible hoping to transmute the world through hubris (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 2006). This hubris is perhaps foreboded in 40:11-12 but then embodied by the boasting of the hybrid body of Leviathan in 41:4, 7, 26.

All of this seems to be the case with Behemoth and Leviathan. Even when some have tried to recognised a hippopotamus and a crocodile (an herbivore and a carnivore) in them respectively, Driver (1956) regards Behemoth as a crocodile and Leviathan as a whale. The range of alternatives includes an elephant (Stauffer, 1951), a dolphin (Eerdmans, 1939) or a wild buffalo (Couroyer, 1975, 1987) for Behemoth, and a dragon for Leviathan (in the Septuagint; 40:30 suggests something fishy) (Van Wolde, 2021). Others (Dyssel, 2017) group them with reptiles and serpents, to mention just a few possibilities. Driver and Gray (1921) even divides the passage about Leviathan into two originally independent poems dealing in 40:25-41:3 with a sea-monster and in 41:4-26 with a crocodile. Ruprecht (1971), on the other hand, regards the two monsters as the same animal which would for a psychoanalytic perspective be immaterial, as both images flow from the same unconscious where they could be one.

The description of the two monsters is therefore an embroidery of realistic, emphasised by Clines (2011), supernatural and mythical (Caquot, 1992), fancifully hyperbolic (Alter, 1984), anthropomorphic (such as sneezing) by Clines (2011) and even symbolic (Ansell 2017) images. In Blake’s “Illustrations of the book of Job” (referred to by Clines, 2011) the two monsters are parts of Job’s own psyche.

The noun, לִוְיָתָן (Leviathan), occurs, however, only once in the second divine speech and is derived from לָוַי (probably: twist, encircle), suggesting a serpentine movement. Identifying these two figures with known animals always fails as certain features do not fit reality and so the images are rather a mixture of reality and fantasy. As Beal (2002, p. 52) aptly puts it: “[…] an impossibly over-determined amalgam of features (fire, water, smoke, armor, weaponry, animalia, etc.) stitched together into one monstrous body […] combines different elements that are categorically exclusive of one another, and thereby jams the imagination’s ability to form a complete picture of the monster […]”.

This is what happens with internal object-relations according to Klein (1975). When the result is a monster, this need not be a psychotic symptom as Lehman (1960) wanted to suggest. Some, such as Balentine (1998) and Beal (2002), have recognised God in Leviathan due to sudden shifts of identities between them in the text, as likewise indomitable and therefore unassimilable (Kristeva, 1980). Clines (2011) summarises the dangerous but tranquil Behemoth (as image of the abject), likening it to God as ignoring “[…] rules and rationality and principles of utility, even aesthetics”.

It may, however, not be coincidental that both Satan and monsters are mentioned in the book of Job more than elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible, with the description of Leviathan being even longer than that of any other animal body in the Jewish and Christian religious canon. Satan is, like the monsters, pictured with body-parts such as a hand and an implied mouth when he speaks. As the book is peculiar...
with several framings, the silence about Satan at the end is conspicuous, unless he is disguised in the two monstrosities of unrecognisable, perhaps even mixed, bodies painted in the divine speeches. Perhaps Satan represents Job’s self-subversive, self-challenging self-doubt when facing his own monster-aggression which makes him physically sick but ultimately asserts itself against the superego. In a similar way, the monster-pair might even embody the curse as subtheme from the prologue. One could further speculate whether the monstrous pair refer to the Kleinian asymmetrical good and bad breasts of the rejected maternal body mentioned early in the book as well. Drewermann (1985) recognises guilt feelings as closely linked to the fantasy of the devouring maternal breast but disguised as monstrous creatures in myths and fairy tales but really residing in the abysmal recesses of the unconscious. Sacrifice embodies this monstrous in an often less visible way and led to a monstrous image of God at least in both Judaism and Christianity (Drewermann, 1990).

Yet, there is no textual proof that Satan is in anyway perverted or a transgressor in the book of Job. In fact, he is the one challenging and accusing others of perverted piety. Traditionally נָחָשׁ (the serpent, that is, with the definite article), perhaps a kind of reptile-monster, in Genesis 3:1,2,4,13,14 (in Job 26:13 שָׁנָא has no article and may be a generalisation or a proper name) has been identified with the Satan, although there is once again no textual proof for that (Beal, 2002). In Isaiah 27:1, however, לִוְיָתָן נָחָשׁ שָׁנָא (leviathan, slant / fleeing serpent [both without the definite article]), are in apposition, the second noun being an epithet, and perhaps also synonymous with the juxtaposed נָחָשׁ לוֹיְתָן (leviathan, tortuous serpent [both without the definite article]) and even with נָחָשׁ (the [sea-]dragon; Job 7:12).

**Disabled body**

Apart from an immoral monstrosity the abject could be in the form of an amoral monster, even though the anomaly of immorality and that of pathology are not that different in the unconscious. That the two are mentally linked is shown by Foucault’s (1961) observation that the historical age when madness was naturalised, also naturalised monsters.

A monster could stand for various bodily burdens such as disturbing biofluids, birth deformities and defects, being a grotesque, disfigured, disabled, dysfunctional, ill, injured, alien, freaky, or ugly body. The aesthetics of the abject consists of its sublimity, not beauty. It can still be sensitive and sensual. These corporeal conflicts, in English, often expressed through adjectives prefixed by “de-” or “dis-”, can lead to body dysmorphic disorder due to the shaming gaze of the other which determines body-images through identification, introjection and projection (Parker, 2014). Such negatively evaluated body-parts are psychically separated as abject fragment (Cohen, 1996) from the centre to become a dangerous monster outside but threateningly surrounding, infiltrating and displacing any sense of identity, while still remaining inside the subject (Kristeva, 1980), just as the monster is also inside (Kearney, 2005). Being an unincorporated other at an unthought boundary phenomena at the vertiginous edge of existence precedes and thus possesses the self.

Kristeva (1980) regards the disabled body, especially when congenital, as a representation of the abject, as it confuses identity and therefore order. Davis (1997) points out that the disabled body is not that of a minority but originally built into everybody from birth.

Shildrick (2002) notes how the response to the disabled and monstrosities is similar, as both confront one with ambiguity and fluidity, and therefore both are at least psychically excluded and rejected as undesired-different and potentially hostile bodies.
The way the two monsters have been described leaves the impression that they are biotechnologically assisted, as if they are armoured and protected by some carapace or an exoskeleton for mobility disabled.

Compared to the perverted body, it would be more meaningful to regard the phantasmagoric pair as the disguised body-images of the ill and disabled protagonist (Van der Zwan, 2022), a hopefully liberating projection of his own anxieties, aggression and sexuality. It can hardly be coincidence that the same metaphor of weaving is used for both Job’s body in 10:11 and Behemoth’s body in 40:17, although two different Hebrew verbs are used. This possible projection is even the case if it seems on the surface as if God wants to induce horror in Job and wake him up. However, it is the already woken-up Job who can see body-images not excluding but paradoxically including the unnameable abject outside its boundary. Unlike the collective superego of the false friends, God includes and even revels in the chaotic id. What would have been lost as refusing incorporation into the ego is visually and verbally imaged in Job’s body-experience as it is in the text as well. It is possible that the two monster-shapes are the shifting boundaries of his (seemingly distorted) body-images being more than threatening to erupt into a (seemingly stable but alienating) social, specular image as ideological body-ideal (Weiss, 1999).

After the horrific, sublime scene ending in 41:26 about Leviathan which intimidates even the (gods) in 41:17, Job reacts with his last recorded words in the five verses of 42:2-6 concluding with: (upon dust and ashes). Kearney (2005) interprets these final words of self-abjection as haemorrhaging the self in utter humiliation emptying the ego in pain, rather than simply humility.

**Conclusion**

Fantasy, and more specifically fiction, can feed and flow into religion symbolised as spirituality even when it is ultimately anchored in abject bodily experiences and desires which potentially subvert the ideological superego-superstructure.

This is also the case with the monstrous images in the second divine speech in the book of Job where they embody the abject. Here the protagonist has been suffering in his body and therefore also in his psychic body-images which these animal-monstrosities reflect as a conflation of his ill, angry body with his lost maternal body.

What he experiences as the visual models offered by the audible Divine confront but also liberates his abject, embodied aggression from the oppressive body-ideals imposed by the collective superego. What he experiences as divine revelation strengthens his ego to fight for emancipation from the illegitimate authority of this superego. The Divine, therefore, does not support the Symbolic of the superego but affirms the ultimate Real of the body and its id with which the ego is reconciled through the Imaginary.

When monstrous images manage to be included into a religious canon, not as diabolic and demonic to be exorcised, but as rehabilitated, the abject as potentially perverse and disabled body-shadows can be integrated into assertive body-images.

**References**


* It might be significant that bodies of the deities studied by Sommer (2009), are, like body-images, fluid and multiple. This would suggest that these divine bodies are actually projected human body-images.


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